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I. INTRODUCTION
Arguably, one of the most important steps in the development of a
startup or small business is getting access to adequate capital. As one
writer for Forbes put it, "[t]he first sentence in the job description of
every CEO should be, 'Get the capital your company needs."" A
business can satisfy its needs for capital through one of several avenues
such as taking on debt or seeking out investors through personal
relationships.2 However, these avenues may not provide for all of the
capital that a growing business needs. In some situations, the sale of
securities can provide a large amount of capital to a small business.' The
issuance of securities must comply with the various federal and state
securities laws, which can be onerous for a new company, and the cost
of raising capital must be accounted for no matter what process is used.
A primary goal of any environment that is designed to promote small
business creation and growth is providing access to adequate capital.
Regulation D under the Securities Act of 1933 provides several avenues
for a small business to offer securities to investors, while, at the same
time, minimizing the cost of the offering by exempting the transaction
from many of the more costly aspects of selling securities through
* Juris Doctor Candidate, Class of 2016, The Ohio State University Moritz College
of Law. I am grateful to Alexis Triffon and my parents, Barry and Nancy Tiemeier,
for their support throughout this endeavor.
I Jim Blasingame, Three Fundamentals of Small Business Capitalization, FORBES
(May 12, 2014, 11:00 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/imblasingame/2014/05/12/three-fundamentals-of-
small-business-capitalization/.
2 See Small Business and the SEC: A Guide For Small Business on Raising Capital
and Complying with the Federal Securities Laws, SEC (Oct. 10, 2013),
http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/qasbsec.htm#capital.
I See, e.g., Vladimir Ivanov & Scott Bauguess, Capital Raising in the U.S.: An
Analysis of Unregistered Offerings Using the Regulation D Exemption, 2009-2012,
SEC DIVIsION OF ECONOMIC RISK AND ANALYSIS (July 2013),
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/riskfin/whitepapers/dera-unregistered-offerings-reg-
d.pdf,
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traditional methods such as an initial public offering.4 Specifically, SEC
Regulation D provides a few major exceptions to the filing requirements
under federal law.5
Rule 506 of Regulation D has drawn a lot of attention lately, as
Congress, the SEC, issuers and investors grapple with the how best to
promote small business capital formation while still protecting the
investors that those businesses rely on. In some ways the changes to
Rule 506 highlight the actual steps that the federal government can take
to enhance small business capital formation by opening private
placements to a larger pool of potential investors. However, the ongoing
debate and continued proposals for change show the lack of consensus
in how best to achieve an environment that is good for small businesses
and investors.
One particular source of debate centers on where demo days fit into
the regulatory structure. A demo day is typically an event where
companies mostly discuss their products or services without necessarily
an explicit expectation that the companies will discuss any proposed or
ongoing capital raising transaction or will receive any investment.6
Demo days often take the form of extremely short presentations by
startups to investors that are organized by accelerators or incubators
(venture capital funds whose main goal is to increase the odds of
building a successful business sometimes in return for a small amount of
equity).7 For example Y Combinator and StartX both routinely put on
demo days for companies that they have invested in and helped grow up
to that point. These events involve presentations by each company, as
short as two minutes each, where the company will try to market itself to
a room of investors and press. Some of the recent success stories from
to come out of Y Combinator were DropBox in 2007 and AirBnB in
2009.8 Regardless of the success of the startups coming out of demo
4 See generally PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, CONSIDERING AN IPO? THE COSTS
OF GOING AND BEING PUBLIC MAY SURPRISE You (2012).
5 17 C.F.R. § 230.500 (2013).
6 Joseph M. Wallin, General Solicitation and Start-up Capital Raising: Existing
Guidance and New Questions, Thomson Rueters Practical Law Corporate &
Securities 5, http://www.startuplawblog.con/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/General-
Solicitation-and-Startup-Capital-Raising.pdf.
7 Mark Lennon, The Startup Accelerator Trend is Finally Slowing Down,
TECHCRUNCH (Nov. 19, 2013), http://techcrunch.com/2013/11/19/the-startup-
accelerator-trend-is-finally-slowing-down/; Y Combinator's standard deal for
helping a startup is $120,000 for 7% of the company's equity
(https://www.ycombinator.com/faq/). Not all accelerators take an equity stake in
the businesses they support. For instance, StartX is an accelerator program that
provides access to a fund that partners with Stanford University and takes no equity
as a matter of policy (http://startx.stanford.edu/accelerator).
8 Nick Gonzalez, Y Combinator Demo Day: The Summer Startups, TECHCRUNCH,
(Aug. 16, 2007) http://techcrunch.com/2007/08/16/y-combinator-demo-day-the-
summer-startups/; Leena Rao, Y Combinator Demo Day Spring 2009,
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days, their place within the Regulation D structure was never fully
settled. This issue has caused much confusion, and will serve as a
focusing tool in the further discussion of the changes to Regulation D.
This Note will examine the recent changes to Rule 506 and
Regulation D, what other measures have been proposed, and what
changes should come in the future. The focus will be on the standards
determining who is an accredited investor, and what is general
solicitation under the present regulatory structure. Section II is a review
of Regulation D and private placements. Section III looks at the
competing interests behind why the exempted offering rules were
changed and reasons why other attempts at change have not succeeded
as of yet. Section IV outlines a proposal for how Congress and the SEC
could act to bridge the gap between the stated concerns of its members
and those of the businesses and investors that they are tasked with
supporting. Specifically, the SEC should update the accredited investor
definition to better represent the nature of modem investors and the
protection that these individuals actually require, and better identify the
scope and limits of the general solicitation allowance.
II. PRIVATE PLACEMENTS
A. Origins
The Securities Act of 1933 imposes many requirements on the sale
of securities, and a corporation will incur significant costs in meeting
these requirements.9 The time and expense that go into an IPO will
foreclose many small and emerging businesses from raising capital by
selling securities through this process.10 The SEC responded to this issue
in 1982 by promulgating Regulation D, which consisted of six rules that
exempt certain limited offerings of securities from SEC registration that
was required by section 5 of the Securities Act.' Regulation D
expanded and unified the previous exemption structure, while still
staying within the safe harbor provision of Section 4 of the Securities
Act.12 Regulation D created rules 504, 505, and 506 as a replacement to
TECHCRUNCH, (Mar. 18, 2009) http://techcrunch.com/2009/03/18/y-combinator-
demo-day-spring-2009/.
9 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq. (YEAR). The costs associated
with going public vary widely and increase as a company's revenue increases, with
the average cost for a company with revenues of less than $100 million averaging
about $11.5 million. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 4, at 8.
"o See Manning Gilbert Warren III, A Review of Regulation D: The Present
Exemption Regimen for Limited Offerings Under the Securities Act of 1933, 33 Am.
U. L. REv. 355 (1982).
11 Id. at 357.
12 Id. at 358-59; see also Securities Act of 1933 § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 77d (2012).
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rules 240, 242, and 146.13
Prior to 2012, Regulation D consisted of three substantive rules for
exempting the offer and sale of securities from the registration process. 14
Specifically, Rules 504, 505 and 506 set forth the required elements of
the three main types of private placements. Rule 504 private placements
must not exceed $1,000,000 and are subject to state securities law. 15
Rule 505 private placements must not exceed $5,000,000 and are limited
to 35 purchasers. 6 Rule 506 offered the least amount of restrictions out
of the three, as the only restriction was on the amount of non-accredited
investors allowed.'7 Regulation D's three other rules, 501, 502 and 503,
set forth the general requirements, definitions, terms, and conditions for
the operative provisions, including the standards for an accredited
investor and a ban on the use of general solicitation. 18
Rule 501(a) provides the definition of who is an accredited
investor.'9 The rule sets out separate accreditation requirements for
certain institutions and individuals. For instance, an individual with a net
worth of over $1,000,000 or an income of over $200,000 for the past
two years with a reasonable belief that this level of income will continue
is deemed accredited (subject to certain adjustments such as if the
person files jointly with a spouse).2" The accreditation standards are
designed to protect investors by limiting access to exempted offerings to
only those that are deemed to be able to handle the risk involved in
exempted offerings.2 '
The ban on general solicitation is very broad, and the exceptions
included within the rules are narrow. The rules speak to a ban on the use
13 Warren, supra note 10, at 357-58.
"4 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.504 et seq. (2012).15 Id. § 230.504.
16 Id. § 230.505.
17 Id. § 230.506.
18 The main provisions at issue are 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (2013) (defining
"accredited investor") and 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c) (2013) (banning general
solicitation or advertising).
191 Id. § 230.501(a).20 Id. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010
altered the definition of accredited investor by excluding the value of an
individual's primary residence from the calculation of the individual's net worth in
17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(5)(i)(A). Net Worth Standard For Accredited Investors,
Securities Act Release No. 33-9287 (Dec. 21, 2011).
21 The reasoning for the accredited investor standard comes from the same
distinction between public and private offerings. In SEC v. Ralston-Purina, the
Supreme Court held that the availability of the exemption from registration and
disclosure requirements "should turn on whether the particular class of persons
affected needs the protections of the Act.... An offering to those who are shown
to be able to fend for themselves is a transaction 'not involving any public
offering."' S.E.C. v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953); see also
Nonpublic Offering Exemption, Securities Act Release No. 33-4552 (Nov. 6,
1962).
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of both general solicitation and general advertising in the offering or
sale of securities. Rather than provide a definition for general
solicitation, the rule is based on the inclusion of what the SEC calls
examples.2 The rules lay out general solicitation and general advertising
in this particular section as a non-exclusive list of what constitutes
general solicitation and general advertising. 23 The listed items include
"Any advertisement, article, notice or other communication published in
any newspaper, magazine, or similar media or broadcast over television
or radio. ' ' 24 The rule then goes on to include "[a]ny seminar or meeting
whose attendees have been invited by any general solicitation or general
advertising." 5 These two operative clauses are the entirety of the listed
items that are included in the stated ban on general solicitation.
The SEC staff used the broad examples in the rule to offer
interpretations as questions arise.26 Since general solicitation was first
laid out in Regulation D, the SEC staff has relied upon the idea of
preexisting relationships to interpret whether an action constitutes
general solicitation.27 Many of the no action letters that the SEC staff
issued dealing with general solicitation at that time focused on the fact
of whether there existed a prior relationship between the issuer and the
investor that would allow the investor a better opportunity to make an
informed decision.28
The rule also includes two exceptions to the general ban, besides the
actual private offerings that are not subject to the ban after 2013.29 The first
allows an issuer to publish a limited notice of certain filings with the
SEC,3" and the second allows for journalist access to certain press
conferences and meetings conducted or released outside of the United
States.3 Outside of the exception for a notice of sales on Form D, the
other listed exceptions require compliance with regulations that are both
22 Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and General
Advertising in Rule 506 and Rule 144A Offerings, 78 Fed. Reg. 44,771, 44,773
(July 24, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 230, 239, and 242).
23 Although 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c) addresses both general solicitation and general
advertising, it is often referred to as the ban on general solicitation. Therefore,
when general solicitation is hereinafter referenced, it is inclusive of general
advertising rather than apart from it. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c)(1)(2013).
24 Id. § 230.502(c)(1).
25 Id. § 230.502(c)(2).
26 Eliminating the Prohibition, supra note 22, at 44,773.
27 Interpretive Release on Regulation D, 48 Fed. Reg. 10,045, 10,052 (Mar. 10,
1983).
28 See David D.H. Martin Jr. & L. Keith Parsons, The Preexisting Relationship
Doctrine Under Regulation D: A Rule Without a Reason, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REv.
1031, 1041-43 (1988); Courts have also utilized the preexisting relationship
doctrine. Mark v. FSC Sec. Corp., 870 F.2d 331 (1989).
29 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(c) (2013).
30 See id § 230.135(c).
31 See id § 230.135(e).
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written for the purposes of Section 5 of the Securities Act dealing with
prohibitions relating to interstate commerce and the mails.
As a comparison, within the group of regulations specifically for
the purpose of this section of the Securities Act, 17 CFR 230.135a
provides a definition for generic advertising that would not be deemed
to constitute an offer any security for sale. This definition is
comprehensive rather than a non-exclusive list, and allows for
communication of broad level information about investment companies
and the general nature of their securities.32 While the allowances for
generic advertising cater to a different need than those of general
solicitation in 17 CFR 230.502(c), the main takeaway is the contrast in
the style of the rule. Generic advertising is concretely defined in one,
while the boundaries of general solicitation and general advertising are
left to the interpretation of the SEC in the other. For example, the SEC
gave some guidance on the use of the internet in connection with the ban
on general solicitation.
The SEC issued an interpretation in 1995 that included the
Commission's view "that the use of electronic media should be at least
an equal alternative to the use of paper-based media. Accordingly, issuer
or third party information that can be delivered in paper under the
federal securities laws may be delivered in electronic format."33 Among
the documents included in the SEC's consideration were disclosure
documents required in Rule 505 and 506 offerings, but the SEC
cautioned issuers to be "mindful of the current prohibition in Rules 505
and 506 regarding general solicitation. '34 To aid issuers, the SEC
included an example for applying the interpretation's principles to
issuers selling stock through a Rule 506 private placement.35 In this
hypothetical, the SEC stated that if a company puts its offering materials
on a website, even if the site requires information to be sent to the
company from the person attempting to access the information prior to
displaying the offering materials, it would be inconsistent with the ban
on general solicitation.36 However, "[w]here prospective purchasers
have been otherwise located without a general solicitation, a proprietary
computer service could be used to deliver required disclosure
documents. '37 Furthermore, a company can transmit the offering
materials to email addresses supplied by individuals it has located
without using general solicitation without violating the ban on general
32 See id § 230.135(a).
13 Use of Electronic Media For Delivery Purposes, SEC Release No. 33-7233, 1995
WL 588462, 6 (Oct. 6, 1995).34 Id. at 3 n.9.
35 See id. at 17.
36 Id.
37 Id.
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solicitation.38
The next year, the SEC staff issued a no-action letter that the
posting of a notice of a private offering would not be taken as general
solicitation when the notice was in a password-protected page of the
website that was accessible only to the site's members who had
previously qualified with the website to be an accredited investor.39 The
SEC confirmed the staffs view that other use of available media, such
as unrestricted web sites, is general solicitation.4" These are just some
examples of ways in which the SEC and its staff look to offer a more
complete picture of the rules and regulations. Whereas these past
interpretations were at the request of individuals or on the initiative of
the SEC, the recent changes stem from a Congressional mandate.
B. Recent Developments
The Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS Act) of 2012
changed Rule 506 by creating two separate situations where an offering
will fit under the exemption. Title II of the JOBS Act, entitled Access to
Capital for Job Creators, transformed Rule 506 through a few key
changes.41 Specifically, the JOBS Act mandated that the SEC must
revise Rules 502 and 506 to allow general solicitation for Rule 506
offerings when the issuer had taken reasonable steps to verify that all of
the potential investors were accredited.42
The SEC responded in July 2013 by finalizing rules that went into
effect that September to put the congressional mandate into effect.4 3 The
new rules essentially created a new form of exempted transaction under
Rule 506. 44 Rule 506(b) mirrors the old Rule 506, but Rule 506(c) now
stands as a separate form of offering. There are three main differences
between Rule 506(b) and Rule 506(c). In a Rule 506(c) offering: 1) all
of the investors must be accredited, 2) the issuer must take reasonable
steps to verify the accreditation of the investors, and 3) the issuer can
engage in general solicitation.
Specifically looking at the second difference, the language of
Rule 506(b) merely requires that an issuer have a reasonable belief that
an investor is accredited.45 However, Rule 506(c) requires an issuer to
38 Id.
39 IPONET, SEC No-Action Letter, 1996 WL 431821, 1 (July 26, 1996).
40 Eliminating the Prohibition, supra note 22, at 44,773 n.26 (citing Use of
Electronic Media, supra note 33).
41 Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat
306, § 201 (2012).
42 Id.
43 See Eliminating the Prohibition, supra note 22, at 44,771.
44 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2013).
45 Id. § 230.506(b)(2)(i).
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"take reasonable steps to verify that purchasers . .. are accredited
investors."46 The rule further provides a non-exclusive list of methods to
verify accreditation. The SEC has offered some further guidance in
compliance and disclosure interpretations as to how an issuer may verify
the accreditation status of potential investors,47 but the process remains
somewhat hazy. The SEC viewed the new verification model as
adequately addressing the changes that were mandated in the JOBS Act
while still maintaining flexibility. 8
The final difference does not come explicitly from Rule 506's
modified language. Rather, the operative language was found in Rule
502(c), which specifically carves out Rule 506(c) from the limitations
on general solicitation or general advertising.49 General solicitation can
be vitally important to a new business that requires access to more
capital than the personal networks of the business owners allow. Thus a
small business can seek out ideal investors to help reach its goals.
Although the investors must be accredited, this requirement does not
necessarily hamper this process. At least one commentator believed that:
1) accredited investors are more likely to have the means to invest than
non-accredited investors thereby allowing a company to reach its goals
with fewer investors, 2) accredited investors are less likely to attempt to
exert influence over the business, and 3) an accredited investor is more
likely to be able to introduce other investors to the company. 0
Broadening the pool through general solicitation may be vitally
important to whether a business can get what it needs to succeed.
C. Usage
A quick look at the numbers displays the large market for private
offerings. The values should only be thought of as an illustration of the
market because, although the amounts are properly counted,
comprehensive values are difficult for this market." The exempted
offering system was used extensively prior to these rule changes. A
study from the Division of Economic and Risk Analysis (DERA) of the
46 Id. § 230.506(c)(2)(ii).
4 SEC Staff Compliance and Disclosure Interpretations: Securities Act Rules
(Questions 255.48, 255.49, 260.35, 260.36, 260.37, 260.38 ) (July 3, 2014),
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/securitiesactrules-interps.htm.
48 Eliminating the Prohibition, supra note 22, at 44,776.
49 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c) (2013).
50 Deal Marketing on the Internet The Outlook for 2014, DEALFLOW 4-6 (Jan.
2014), http://dealflow.com/whitepapers/DealflowWhite Paper Q4_2013.pdf.
The efficacy of this system may be muted to some extent by the need to take
reasonable steps to verify the accreditation status of a potential investor.
"' See, e.g., Eliminating the Prohibition, supra note 22, at 44,788 (limiting
economic analysis to what has been disclosed on Form D, which may not be
wholly representative of the entire market).
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SEC reported totals of $595 billion raised in 2009, over $1 trillion raised
in 2010, $863 billion raised in 2011, and $903 billion raised in 2012
through exempted offerings.12 The study further revealed that offerings
under the previous version of Rule 506 accounted for 94% of Regulation
D offerings between 2009 and 2012 and 99% of reported capital raised
during that same time period. 3 Between 2009-2012, the average
Regulation D offering was about $30 million, while the median offering
size was about $1.5 million 4.5 This difference between the average and
the median size indicates that the exempted offering market is composed
of many smaller offerings, which according to the SEC is "consistent
with the view that many smaller businesses are relying on Regulation D
to raise capital... 55
The JOBS Act changes to Rule 506 offerings were designed to
make it easier for small businesses to access the capital they need, but
issuers have been somewhat hesitant to utilize Rule 506(c) offerings.
Between the middle of the third quarter of 2013, when the rules went
into effect, and December 2013, approximately 270 issuers told the SEC
that they were offering under 506(c) with an aggregate value of $3.7
billion 6.5 By March 2014, Keith Higgins, the Director of the SEC
Division of Corporate Finance, announced that 900 offerings had taken
place under 506(c), which had raised more than $10 billion. During the
same period, over 9,200 offerings were conducted under 506(b)--the
old rule 506-and these new offerings resulted in the sale of over $223
billion in securities. 7 Thus, although large amounts had been raised
during this time, there was not large-scale shift to the new private
offering structure. Perhaps it is still too early in the process for the
effects to be felt, but the numbers at least provide some context for the
discussion.
III. COMPETING INTERESTS AND CONFUSION IN THE SEC
A. Varying Policies
Issuers and investors are not the only groups to cast a wary eye on
the new regulations, debate has flourished over whether the new
regulations go far enough, or too far, in promoting small business capital
formation. Essentially, the concern over the proposed and adopted rules
rested on the fundamental struggle between promoting small businesses
52 Ivanov and Baugess, supra note 3, at 4.
53Id. at 7.
14 Id. at 5.
51 Eliminating the Prohibition, supra note 22, at 44,790.
56 Dealflow, supra note 49, at 7.57 Keith F. Higgins, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Keynote Address at the 2014 Angel
Capital Association Summit (March 28, 2014).
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and protecting the investors that these businesses rely on.
The Securities Act came during the Great Depression in part to
protect investors through disclosure requirements and antifraud
protections.58 However, it took 50 years for the SEC to respond to calls
that the 1933 Act and subsequent laws extended too far and kept many
small businesses out of the markets.59 In 1982, the SEC adopted
Regulation D, and the SEC's main policy aim in adopting Regulation D
was to "facilitate capital formation consistent with the goal of investor
protection under the 1933 Act."6
The JOBS Act's stated goal was "to increase American job creation
and economic growth by improving access to public capital markets for
emerging growth companies.' 61 In showing his support for the JOBS
Act, Congressman Pete Sessions viewed the amendments to Regulation
D as alleviating a credit problem in the economy.62 Thus, the focus of
the JOBS Act and the changes to Rule 506 are to some extent
conceptually different from that of the statutory and regulatory
framework it is based on.
B. Division in the SEC
1. Views on the JOBS Act
The conflict between protecting investors and promoting small
business capital formation at the highest levels of the SEC was on full
display during the SEC rule making process in response to the JOBS
Act. The SEC proposed the first set of post-JOBS Act regulation D rules
in September of 2012, including an allowance for general solicitation in
rule 506 offerings to a group of only accredited investors that the issuer
has taken reasonable steps to verify.63 These fairly straightforward rules
took almost a year to be finalized, and the only major change to the Rule
506 exempted offering was the inclusion of a non-exhaustive list of
ways for an issuer to verify that an investor is accredited. 64
SEC Chair Mary Jo White acknowledged these competing interests
when the SEC began considering how to implement the JOBS Act's call
for change to Regulation D. The JOBS Act had mandated SEC action 90
58 Securities Act, supra note 9.
59 See Warren, supra note 10.60 Id. at 358.
61 Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat.
306 (2012).
62 158 CONG. REc. H1222, 1223-24 (daily ed. March 7, 2012) (statement of Rep.
Pete Sessions).
63 Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and General
Advertising in Rule 506 and Rule 144A Offerings, 77 Fed. Reg. 54,464, 54,465
(Sept. 5, 2012)(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230 and 239).
4 Eliminating the Prohibition, supra note 22, at 44,780.
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days after enactment in April 2012, but did not propose any rules until
September. In early July of the following year, White noted the passage
of the deadline and called the SEC to act on the proposed rules. 61
However, she still was unsure about how to go about the issue noting
widespread concerns about "whether the Commission can and should
defer lifting the general solicitation ban while we pursue and adopt
related discretionary rulemaking designed to provide more investor
protections in this new market. '66 White believed that investor
protection was important enough to warrant what amounted to a dual
mission of promulgating rules to open the markets to small business and
forming other rules on top of them to protect investors.67
Not all of the SEC Commissioners shared White's view that this
dual purpose was necessary or even prudent. In September 2014,
Commissioner Daniel M. Gallagher characterized the some of the SEC's
proposed rules in response to the JOBS Act mandate as undoing some of
the benefits in the statute and imposing new burdens on exempted
transactions.68 Gallagher's critical remarks rested on his foundational
belief that enhancing small business's access to capital was the primary
and overriding concern.69
On the same day that this first set of rules was finalized in late July
2013,70 the SEC proposed a second round of changes to Rule 506. The
main thrust of these rule changes was a much more involved disclosure
system surrounding Rule 506(c) offerings by necessitating certain
disclosures before and after the offering, as well as the inclusion of
65 Mary Jo White, Chair, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Statement at the SEC Open
Meeting (July 10, 2013).66 Id.
67 White almost seemed compelled against her judgment to act:
In my view, given the explicit language of the JOBS Act as well
as the statutory deadline that passed last July, the Commission
should act without any further delay. This does not mean,
however, that the Commission should not take steps to pursue
additional investor safeguards if and where such measures
become necessary once the ban on general solicitation is lifted.
Id.
68 Daniel M. Gallagher, Comm'r, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Speech: Whatever
Happened to Promoting Small Business Capital Formation? (Sept. 17, 2014).
69Id:
I believe that the issue [small business representation in the
legislative and regulatory process] warrants the agency's highest
level of priority .... [T]he SEC has the ability to pursue
meaningful reforms-both substantive and procedural-that
could significantly improve small business capital formation.
Hopefully, someday we actually will, unprompted by Congress.
70 See Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and General
Advertising in Rule 506 and Rule 144A Offerings: A Small Entity Compliance
Guide, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/secg/general-solicitation-small-
entity-compliance-guide.htm (last modified Sept. 20, 2013).
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certain information in all solicitation and advertising materials.71 The
stated goal of the SEC in proposing these rules was "to address investor
protection concerns arising from the ability of issuers, including private
funds, to generally solicit for their Rule 506(c) offerings."72 Thus, it
appeared that the concern for protecting investors had found a response
to the thrust of the JOBS Act.
Indeed, many on the SEC staff lauded the proposed changes.
SEC Commissioner Elisse B. Walter stated her belief that these
proposed investor protections were a necessary response to the just
passed rules, and "the Commission needs to move forward with these
proposals."73 Commissioner Luis A. Aguilar expressed a similar view,
but he felt that investor protections were even more necessary. Aguilar
stated, "I'm afraid that any protections resulting from today's proposal
will come too late, if they come at all, for many investors .... Investors
should not be at risk any longer than is necessary."74 Support for the
rules seemed to be lining up behind the goal of protecting investors.
However, other Commissioners were not persuaded by the calls
for increased investor protections. Commissioner Troy A. Paredes
dissented from the proposed rules because "the proposal provides for a
regulatory regime that would unduly burden and restrict the capital
formation process."75 Commissioner Gallaher also dissented from the
proposed rules because of the possibility for increased regulation to
undermine the entire private market system.76 These dissenting
Commissioners based their views on the belief that increasing regulation
to cover a problem that had not yet materialized was overstepping the
bounds of the SEC and would unduly burden businesses seeking an
exempted offering by forcing them to comply with a range of
requirements that to a certain extent undermined the reason for the
initial JOBS Act reforms.77
The passage of these proposed rules did not face a
71 Amendment to Regulation D, Form D and Rule 156, 78 Fed. Reg. 44,806,
44,806 (July 24, 2013).72 Id. at 44,8 2 1.
73 Elisse B. Walter, Comm'r, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Opening Remarks Regarding
the Adoption of Rules Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation, the
Adoption of Rules Regarding Disqualification of "Bad Actors" from Rule 506
Offerings (July 10, 2013).
7' Luis A. Aguilar, Comm'r, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Statement at Open Meeting
July 10, 2013).
5 Troy A. Paredes, Comm'r, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Statement at Open Meeting
Regarding Final Rules Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and
General Advertising in Rule 506 and Rule 144A Offerings; A Final Rule
Disqualifying Felons (July 10, 2013).
76 Daniel M. Gallagher, Comm'r, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Statement at Open
Meeting Regarding Proposed Amendments to Regulation D, Form D and Rule 156
under the Securities Act (July 10, 2013).
77 Id.; Paredes, supra note 75.
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congressionally mandated deadline, and no further official action has
been taken as of August of 2015. The comment period for these
proposed rules was to end on September 23, 2013. However, the SEC
had received comments long past this deadline.78 For instance,
Commissioner Michael S. Piwowar noted a meeting between certain
Commission staff and two lobbying groups to discuss Regulation D
rulemakings on November 24, 2014. 79 Thus, the debate continued for
over a year past the original deadline. The comments ranged from a
group of six senators lauding the proposed changes,80 to an open letter
sent by 49 people advocating for a scaled back version of the rules,81 to
a group of four members of Congress harshly criticizing the proposed
rules.82 In total, there were hundreds of comments from lawmakers,
business leaders, investor groups, and individuals that spanned the
spectrum of ideals and positions.83
2. Uncertainty of Demo Days
The debate within the SEC was not always as polarized on the topic
of general solicitation. For instance, confusion reigned when the
discussion turned to demo days. Shortly before the changes of the JOBS
Act went into effect, the SEC Advisory Committee on Small and
Emerging Companies held an open meeting to discuss many of the
upcoming changes and what the effects would be. The first question that
arose following the opening remarks was whether demo days were
covered under the guidelines of general solicitation through the use of
the word seminar in the second example of 502(c). 84 Catherine Mott, a
member of the advisory committee and a former Chairman of the Angel
Capital Association, asked the question, and the confusion that followed
78 In fact the volume of comments was so great, the SEC extended the comment
period for a little over a month. Amendment to Regulation D, Form D, and Rule
156; Re-Opening of Comment Period, 78 Fed. Reg. 61,222, 61,2222 (proposed
Oct. 3, 2013).
71 Memo from the Office of Comm'r Michael S. Piwowar to File Nos. S7-09-13 &
S7-06-13 (Nov. 24, 2014).
80 Letter from Senators Martin Heinrich, Carl Levin, Tom Harkin, Mark Pryor, Jeff
Merkley, and Angus King to Chairman Mary Jo White (June 28, 2013),
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-13/s70613-1 .pdf.
81 Letter Type A on File No. S7-06-13, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-
13/s70613-48.htm (last modified Aug. 14, 2013).
82 Letter from Congress members Steve Israel, Timothy Bishop, Peter King, and
Carolyn McCarthy to Chairman Mary Jo White (May 8, 2014),
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-13/s70613-503.pdf.
83 See Comments on Proposed Rule: Amendments to Regulation D, Form D and
Rule 156 Under the Securities Act, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-
13/s70613.shtml (last modified Mar. 04, 2015)
84 SEC Advisory Committee on Small and Emerging Companies Open Meeting,
SEC (Sept. 17, 2013, 9:30 AM), http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/acsec/acsec-
transcript-091713.pdf, at *0041.
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highlighted the issue that demo days cause to the SEC for Regulation D.
The acting chief counsel for the SEC Division of Finance noted
that, since neither demo days nor general solicitation are fully defined in
the rules, a bright line answer for whether demo days are general
solicitation did not exist and the determination would be made on the
facts and circumstances." Mott pushed for clarification on the issue,
since "there are thousands of demo days and venture fairs."86 The SEC
Director of Corporate Finance put forth the view that someone must
have concluded that demo days were not general solicitation, or else
they would not have been permitted under the then current rules.8 7
However, according to another advisory committee member, who was
also the Securities Commissioner for the State of Arkansas, every demo
day violated the rules, but the SEC just watched instead of acting
because they are most often sponsored by a state government agency or
effectively the governor's office.88 Nevertheless, none of the individuals
present at the open meeting were able to come to any understanding
besides agreeing that it was a tricky issue. It is clear that something must
be done to try to bring some clarity.
IV. PROPOSED CHANGES
A. The Difficulty of Reaching a Balance
The changes to Rule 506 that have been made or proposed in
recent years raise two preliminary questions. First, with the recent
growth of the market, are further developments even necessary? Second,
to what extent is reaching a balance between promoting small business
capital formation and protecting investors even possible?
For the first question, the answer seems to be past growth does
not preclude further action to protect the advances and propel further
activity in the market. Indeed the JOBS Act changes came on the heels
of three years of relatively high levels of exempted offering activity.
Given the focus on small business growth as a way to stimulate the
51 Id. (quoting Jonathon A. Ingram).
86 Id. at *0041-42 (statement of Catherine V. Mott).
87 Id. at *0042 (statement of Keith Higgins).
88 Id. at *0042-43 (statement of A. Heath Abshure).; This argument really raises the
question of federal and state authority over the securities markets. Demo days are
not necessarily for offerings that are exempt from state blue sky laws, but the
numbers show the disparity in the type of offerings used and the favoritism that is
placed on 506(b) and (c), in part, due to their exemption from state securities law.
If Mr. Abshure's remarks are correct, then state governments are aiding issuers and
investors in violating the federal rules. However, if demo days are not a violation of
the ban on general solicitation, then his views are incorrect and further action may
not be necessary. Either way, the confusion is the main problem, and the SEC has
demonstrated an inability to provide clarity or consistency to the issue.
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economy, the reasoning to attempt to expand the market becomes clear.
The second question is harder to answer, but looking at the
already proposed rules and legislation shows that no single option will
quickly fix the system to the satisfaction of everyone. The debate
surrounding demo days provides a good context to consider the two
main aspects of the current rules that require careful consideration: the
investor accreditation standards and the guidelines of general
solicitation. 9
B. Accreditation Standards
The accreditation standards in Rule 501(a) are not above
reproach;9" the SEC Investor Advisory Committee has recommended a
number of changes that have yet to turn into finalized rules.9 1 Indeed, in
requiring issuers to take reasonable steps to verify the accreditation
status of potential investors, the new standards of Rule 506(c) fully
embrace one of the most controversial aspects of the whole Regulation
D exemption structure, since meeting these standards is now the key for
issuing securities to the widest pool of investors and engaging in general
solicitation.
The accredited investor standard is based on the concept of
identifying persons who "can bear the economic risk of an investment in
unregistered securities, including the ability to hold unregistered (and
89 The current conflict over the Rule 506 exemptions should be considered within
the entire framework of Regulation D. The historic discrepancy between Rule 506
offerings and those under Rules 504 and 505 is considerable and hints at a larger
problem within Regulation D generally. See Ivanov and Baugess, supra note 3, at
4; see also Rutherford B. Campbell, Jr., The Wreck of Regulation D: The
Unintended (and Bad) Outcomes for the SEC s Crown Jewel Exemptions, 66 BUS.
LAW 919, 931-33 (2011). This inequity can be traced to Congress's and the SEC's
unwillingness to remove offerings under Rules 504 and 505 from state blue sky
laws, as the requirement to comply with state securities laws creates an immense
expense to capital formation under these two exemptions. Id. (discussing prior
attempts at legislative change that have failed). However, Congress expanded the
scope of Rule 506 with the JOBS Act rather than addressing the disparate use of
the exemptions. It remains to be seen whether Congress or the SEC will take on
this issue, or if it is even considered an issue outside of academic debate. Although
interesting, the issue is beyond the scope of this paper.
90 See, e.g., Larissa Lee, The Ban Has Lifted. Now is the Time to Change the
Accredited-Investor Standard, 2014 UTAH L. REV. 369, 381 (2014)(discussing the
insufficiency of the accredited investor standard).
91 See generally INVESTOR ADVISORY COMMITTEE, SEC, RECOMMENDATION OF
THE INVESTOR ADVISORY COMMITTEE: ACCREDITED INVESTOR DEFINITION (2014)
(providing recommendations ranged from evaluating the efficacy of the current
standards, to adding a sophistication aspect to the accreditation standard, to limits
on how much an accredited investor could invest, to shifting the burden from the
issuer verify accreditation).
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therefore less liquid) securities for an indefinite period, and, if
necessary, to afford a complete loss on the investment."92 The concept
was "intended to eliminate the need for subjective judgments by the
issuer about suitability, because investors that met the definition of
accredited investor would be presumed to meet the purchase
qualifications." 93 However, the assumption of eliminating subjective
judgments by the issuer comes into question in the context of 506
offerings in both 506(b) because of the knowledge aspect and 506(c)
because of the verification requirement.
The accreditation standards have been questioned for their
reliability,94 as well as for their usefulness entirely because they are
based solely on an investor's wealth and assets.95 One commentator
identified four main areas of protection for investors ion the context of
private offerings: 1) fraud, 2) an unleveled informational playing field,
3) the extraction of private benefits from the firm by firm insiders, and
4) investors' propensity to make unwise investment decision.9 6 Thus,
much of the focus is on the information and experience that a potential
investor has, whereas the bulk of the current accreditation standards are
instead based on economic factors of the investor.9 However, for certain
purposes the Code of Federal Regulations acknowledges that it is the
informational aspect, rather than the economic, that warrants
consideration.
The main draw of accreditation status in a 506(b) offering is that
these investors are not counted against the limit on the number of
purchasers. However, accredited investors also are not subject to the
informational requirement of 506(b), which requires non-accredited
investors to have "such knowledge and experience in financial and
business matters that he is capable of evaluating the merits and risks of
the prospective investment. .". ." Furthermore, the purchaser need not
be the one with the informational basis. A purchaser can satisfy this
requirement by retaining a purchaser representative who by definition
meets the requirement. 99 Thus, the informational component acts in
conjunction with the accredited investor standards, but only for the
purpose of who can purchase in a 506(b) exempted offering.
Since the informational requirement operates only for non-
accredited purchasers under 506(b), it appears that the accreditation
92 Net Worth Standard For Accredited Investors, supra note 20, at 4.
931 Id. at 4 n.17.
9 Michael D. Guttentag, Protection From What? Investor Protection and the JOBS
Act, 13 U.C. DAVIS Bus. L.J. 207,250 (2013).
95 Lee, supra note 90.
96 Guttentag, supra note 95, at 210.
97 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (2013).
98 Id. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii).
99 /d.; id. § 230.501(i).
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standards are meant to cover this informational condition by proxy. The
SEC itself said that it was comfortable with keeping the sophistication
standard in 506(b) when it set forth the verification in 506(c)."'
However, it is not clear whether this is actually the case, and this is the
crux of the arguments in favor of changing the accredited investor
standards. One of the proposed changes is to create a hybrid requirement
that combines the accreditation wealth and asset floors with the
sophistication standards in order to offer better protection that more
accurately reflects the goals of Congress and the SEC. l01
Rather than embrace the informational aspect of 506(b), the SEC
moved in a different direction with 506(c) through a new requirement
that the issuer must take reasonable steps to verify the accreditation
status of the prospective purchasers. 2  This means that the new
requirement not only embraces the accredited investor standards, but it
goes further to make the accredited investor standards the sole form that
a purchaser can utilize to engage in an offering. The difference between
the accredited investor standard and the informational standards in
506(b), and the imposition of a requirement to reasonably attempt to
verify the accreditation status of investors in 506(c), shows that the SEC
is more willing to embrace the current accredited investor standards than
to seek a new rule that encompasses the multitude of ways that an
investor needs protection and can protect themselves.
The SEC did not prescribe the ways that an issuer must verify the
accreditation status of potential purchasers in a 506(c) offering. Rather,
the SEC wanted to allow issuers the flexibility to decide how best to
verify by enumerating a non-exhaustive list of methods in the rule.103
For instance, an issuer can review certain financial documents of the
purchaser, obtain a letter from specific people or entities who
themselves have taken reasonable steps to verify the accreditation status
of the purchaser, or obtain an accreditation certification from the
purchaser if the purchaser was involved in an offering of the same issuer
prior to the enactment of the new rules. 1 4
Thus, these methods of verification not only require issuers to take
action, but they also force potential purchasers to possibly disclose more
information to issuers than previously required. This possibility of
disclosure is what galvanized certain investors to action and led to the
introduction of the Helping Angels Lead Our Startups (HALOS) Act in
'00 Eliminating the Prohibition, supra note 22, at 18.
0 Lee, supra note 90, at 386-87 (explaining that proposed accreditation standard
is a mix of financial sophistication through certification, education or experience,
wealth verification similar to the current rule, investment diversification
requirements); Guttentag, supra note 95, at 255-57.
102 17 CFR § 230.506(c)(2)(ii) (2015).
103 Id. §§ 230.506(c)(2)(ii)(A)-(D).
104Id.
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both the House and the Senate in the summer of 2014.105 The HALOS
Act attempts to deal with the disclosure issue created in 506(c) by
altering the guidelines for general solicitation to allow limited a limited
form of solicitation through demo days while remaining under 506(b),
which would also then subject the offering to the more lenient
accreditation checks contained therein.106
C. The HALOS Act
The HALOS Act was introduced into the House and Senate in June
2014.' 0 It proposed to piggyback on the allowance for general
solicitation under 506(c) by restricting the guidelines of general
solicitation to not include demo days for angel investors. Demo days are
defined in the proposals as events that are sponsored by select groups
where the advertising for the event does not reference any specific
offering by an issuer, the sponsor of the event is limited in its role, and
potential issuers are restricted in the type and amount of information that
they can give out. The HALOS Act was a response to uncertainty in the
investment community about the legality of demo days, which had
previously existed without issue under 506(b), under the new regulatory
framework that included 506(c).1°8 Senator Chris Murphy, one of the
HALOS Act's sponsors, introduced the legislation for the dual purpose
of promoting startup companies by insuring that the small businesses do
not have to comply with more rigid accredited investor verification
requirements of 506(c) and assuring investors that their ability to get
involved with these small businesses will not be inhibited by
unnecessary intrusions into their status.
The main argument presented in favor of the HALOS Act is that
the policy goal of promoting small business capital formation is only
possible when capital markets are open to as broad a range of investors
105 See, e.g., Helping Angels Lead Our Startups (HALOS) Act, H.R. 4915, 113th
Cong. (2013).
106 Id.; 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2013) (issuer must just reasonably believe that the
investor is accredited).
107 Helping Angels Lead Our Startups (HALOS) Act, H.R. 4915, 113th Cong.
(2013).
108 See Chris Murphy, Helping Angels Lead Our Startups (HALOS) Act, SENATE,
http://www.murphy.senate.gov/download/halos-act (last visited Mar. 5, 2015); see
also Alon Y. Kapen, Will Your Demo Day Presentation Violate the Securities
Laws?, N.Y. VENTURE HUB (Aug. 11, 2014),
http://www.nyventurehub.com/2014/08/1 1/will-your-demo-day-presentation-
violate-the-securities-laws/; James Johnson, What Happens to Demo Days in the
New Era of General Solicitation?, FIRST VENTURE LEGAL (Oct. 15, 2013),
http ://www.firstventurelegal.com/what-happens-to-demo-days-in-the-new-era-of-
general-solicitation/; Trent Dykes, Demo Days, Pitch Events, and the New Reg D,
VENTURE ALLEY (Sept. 23, 2013), http://www.theventurealley.com/demo-days-
pitch-events-and-the-new-reg-d/.
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as possible, and, at least in this limited situation, the verification of an
investors accreditation status places onerous obstacles to investor
involvement. 09 The focus is on the actions that a potential investor must
take rather than on what the issuer must do. This argument highlights
the dual nature of the small business capital formation problem. Not
only do business need access to the market, but they need investors that
are willing to engage in the transaction. A delicate balance must be
struck with investor protection mechanisms. If the protections are too
lenient investors are vulnerable to a host of fraud and deception issues;
however, if protections are too strict, then the market may incentivize
investors to not engage in the transaction at all.
In the midst of the rampant uncertainty and speculation, the
HALOS Act attempts to settle the issue. Investors often wrestle with the
uncertainty of whether a business will create a return, but this is only
possible when there is some form of certainty in the structural system in
place that controls these investments. Catherine Mott, the SEC Advisory
Committee on Small and Emerging Companies Member, saw two ways
to address the problem: either the SEC must "define general solicitation
more clearly so entrepreneurs are very clear what they have to do, or
carve out demo days and venture fairs.""' Given the SEC's apparent
lack of willingness, or even the knowledge, to act, it seems that
Congressional action through the HALOS Act may be the only way to
generate the certainty that entrepreneurs and angel investors need to
effectively invest and generate capital.
Thus the HALOS Act is designed to remedy two issues that certain
investors have with Rule 506(c): 1) the possible increased disclosures
from investors so that issuers can verify their accreditation status, and 2)
the uncertainty of whether demo days are within the definition of
general solicitation. By explicitly removing certain demo days from the
guidelines of general solicitation, the HALOS Act offers guidance on
how to structure events to avoid an unintended 506(c) classification."'
An extension of the event not being general solicitation is that the
issuers do not have to verify the accreditation status of the investors, so
the investors do not have to possibly disclose personal information in
order to take part in the offering.
109 See Murphy Introduces Bipartisan Jobs Bill to Support Startups, Small
Businesses, SENATE (June 19, 2014),
http://www.murphy.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/murphy-introduces-
bipartisan-jobs-bill-to-support-startups-small-businesses.
l"Dave Michaels, U.S. Startups Freed to Solicit Funds Fight SEC Over
Disclosures, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 23, 2013, 12:01 AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-09-23/u-s-startups-freed-to-solicit-funds-
fight-sec-over-disclosures.html.
1 Helping Angels Lead Our Startups (HALOS) Act, 113 H.R. 4915, 113th Cong
(2013).
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While the HALOS Act does seem to definitively deal with some of
the issues that have been raised in response to the new rules surrounding
506, a question arises of whether the best route to deal with the problem
is through legislation that is as narrowly tailored as the HALOS Act.
The SEC's actions shows that some form of legislation is likely
required, but the uncertainty of Congress and the more general
confusion surrounding 506 and Regulation D indicates that a piecemeal
approach may not be ideal.
D. General Solicitation
The general solicitation guidelines in Regulation D rely on
breadth with SEC and staff interpretations to fill in the gaps. This is
typical, more or less, for much of the Federal securities structure.
However, the overriding focus on flexibility is hurting issuers in the
context of private offerings where some issuers can engage in general
solicitation while others can't. The confusion over demo days is just one
example at how the extremely limited examples given for general
solicitation do not provide all of the necessary information. Many.in the
press and those on the SEC remain unsure of where the line is for
general solicitation and demo days, even though the SEC staff issued a
no-action letter in 1995 to the Michigan Growth Capital Symposium in
which the staff put forth some key factors in deciding that presenting
companies at the symposium would not be deemed to have generally
solicited." 2 Among the factors that the SEC staff considered in reaching
this determination was that the symposium arranged no prior contact
between presenters and attendees, no specific financing details were part
of the presentations, and no private placement materials were distributed
at the symposium." 3 Thus, there has been almost 20 years for issuers,
investors, and the SEC to come to a better understanding of the
situation, and it is clear from the confusion that no one has been able to.
The main focus of the SEC, judged by the proposed rules, appears
to focus on disclosures and forms related to the offering and the general
solicitation materials used."4 The focus on disclosures and forms is not
bad in and of itself, but it seems premature if an issuer does not have the
information it needs to make the decision of whether or not to engage in
general solicitation. Amending the current general solicitation
framework on an appreciable level can be undertaken by the SEC
unilaterally or through Congressional action such as the HALOS Act.
Both avenues pose distinct problems in gaining the necessary consensus
112 Michigan Growth Capital Symposium, SEC No-Action Letter, Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
77,052 (May 4, 1995).
13 Id
114 See infra Parts II.A-B.
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to put the changes into effect. Congressional action seems to be the
more possible form of change given the focus of the SEC on other
aspects of Regulation D, not to mention everything else the SEC must
deal with. However, no matter how it comes about, something must be
done.
Whether the SEC unilaterally acts pursuant to its rule making
authority, updated guidelines of general solicitation can realistically take
one of two forms. Either general solicitation can be fully defined in the
rules, or the current non-exclusive list can be expanded to provide a
greater understanding to what is considered general solicitation. Both
options offer a degree of clarity that is not currently present in the rules.
While a comprehensive definition of general solicitation would offer
issuers and investors with the greatest certainty as to what falls within
the reach of the rules, the SEC would lose out on the flexibility it
currently has in applying the rules and dealing with unique situations.
Conversely, an expansion of the current guidelines, especially if done
primarily with demo days in mind, may result in an ever-evolving
definition as new issues arise.
A comprehensive definition is more of a deviation from the current
structure than is really necessary. The issue does not warrant a complete
abrogation of the current framework because although the uncertainty
generated by demo days is evident, they are just a single part of the
private placement apparatus. However, demo days do warrant
consideration for creating a new form of exception to the general
solicitation framework that can serve as a basis and an example for
future situations that arise that are not readily dealt with through the
SEC's less formal processes such as no-action letters.
The first part of 17 CFR 230.502(c)(2) does not necessarily require
updating, as it merely extends the prohibitions in 502(c)(1) to how
attendees are invited to a meeting or seminar. The main issue with
502(c)(2) lies in the exceptions that are set out in the rest of the
paragraph. This is not to say the current exceptions pose a problem, but
they too are insufficient in the current landscape. The HALOS Act
offers a prime example of the type of limited and situation based
exception that would begin to mold the general solicitation definition
into something that issuers, investors, and the SEC staff can rely on.
This is not to say that the language promoted by the HALOS Act is the
only or best change, but it fully embodies the structural shift that must
take place since the distinction between general solicitation and not
plays so heavily in the distinction between 506(b) and 506(c).
Further exceptions to the general solicitation framework, especially
one related to demo days, must depart from the nature of the current
exceptions. This is because an exception for demo days cannot be based
on filings or compliance with other aspects of securities regulation.
Thus, the definition to general solicitation must embrace a new form of
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exceptions, ones that are based on current practice rather than on prior
laws and regulations.
The main difference between an exception to the general
solicitation definition for demo days and the additional rules that the
SEC has proposed but not yet adopted is whether demo days are
explicitly kept under 506(b) or kept in limbo between 506(b) and a then
more onerous 506(c). Given their widespread use, and at least tacit
acceptance, under 506(b), the definition of general solicitation should be
amended to create certainty in this area. By explicitly keeping demo
days under 506(b), issuers can tailor their actions to maintain access to
this important source of capital, and investors can be protected from
issuers that may take advantage of the uncertainty.
Outside of the context of demo days, a small change to the general
solicitation examples rather than the exceptions could be useful to
further clarify general solicitation in a way that is consistent with past
interpretations.' 15 Even though the SEC had electronic media in mind
when it created 506(c), 1 6 the current definition only explicitly covers
materials that are published or broadcast through what seems to be print
media, television, or radio. While a newspaper that is published in an
online format may seem to fall under this definition, something like a
social media post does not seem to be covered by the existing standard.
Thus, the modernization of the general solicitation definition must not
only cover the current trends of internet communication, but also be
adaptable to future technological advancements in how people
disseminate information.
For instance, 17 CFR § 230.502(c)(1) can be rewritten as:
Any advertisement, article, notice or other communication
published in any newspaper, magazine, or similar media or
broadcast over television or radio or disseminated over the
internet for public consumption.
The inclusion of "for public consumption" fits with the connotation
of the words publishing and broadcasting as they are currently used in
the definition. More than merely writing the ideas or verbalizing them,
publishing and broadcasting invoke the idea of spreading the
information to the population. Therefore, the inclusion of the internet as
a medium for transmitting solicitation must similarly be tailored to fit
the meaning of the regulation as it is currently written.
The relatively minor change to the examples portion of the
"1 See Use of Electronic Media, supra note 33; 1PONET, supra note 39;
Eliminating the Prohibition, supra note 22.
116 Eliminating the Prohibition, supra note 22, at 81.
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general solicitation framework, and the tonal shift brought into the
exceptions section serves to put the decision of what private placement
rule to follow fully in the hands of an issuer. An issuer should not be
forced to use one rule out of fear that it will inadvertently violate an
unclear provision of another, especially when the rule is predicated on
helping small businesses get access to the capital that they need to
survive.
V. CONCLUSION
The struggle over how to deal with demo days highlights the
incredible connectivity of every part of Regulation D. Uncertainty in
who is an accredited investor and how that status can be verified by
issuers may lead to fewer 506(c) offerings to avoid the issue.
Conversely, the ambiguity of the definition of general solicitation may
cause issuers to more fully embrace 506(c) offerings to avoid the
anxiety over what they can and cannot say to potential investors. Thus,
even small changes to the general solicitation guidelines or the
accredited investor standards can lead to a major impact on how
everyone involved interacts with the entire Regulation D structure.
It took almost 50 years for the SEC to adopt a more centralized
exempted offering structure, and another 30 years after that to start
opening up at least part of the process to target a wider pool of available
capital. Throughout this entire time period vast amounts of money have
been raised, and the SEC has continuously interacted with the system to
balance investor protection with keeping these markets thriving.
Updating the accredited investor standard and the general solicitation
guidelines is just another step in this process, and, compared to creating
Regulation D, a small one.
The alterations proposed here are more about tone than specific
substance. A knowledge component to the accreditation standards, and
situational updates and exceptions to the general solicitation definition
can come in a variety of ways. The symbiotic nature of the accredited
investor standards and the general solicitation guidelines means that
altering one side must be balanced by alterations on the other. The way
that they are then used by issuers and investors and the gloss that the
SEC staff puts over them through their own interpretations will continue
to form and shape any official rule or regulation that is passed. The key
is to proactively engage with the problem rather than allowing
uncertainty to reign. Although it can seem beneficial to pursue some sort
of operational flexibility in the haze, neither the goals of investor
protection nor of promoting capital formation would be served.
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